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When Immediate Responses Fail
Shai Dothan*
ABSTRACT

Tit-for-tat is a strategy of immediate and proportional
responses. Game theorists showed that this strategy often leads to
fruitful cooperation. Indeed, many legal regimes resemble a tit-fortat strategy and fbenefit from its ability to avoid unnecessary
conflicts. But in situations of uncertainty-when actors cannot be
sure about the actions of their adversaries-a tit-for-tat strategy
would destroy cooperation and lead to continuous clashes. Because
tit-for-tat responds immediately, a single mistake about the
intentions of the adversary can lead to retaliation and start an
endless string of counterstrikes. When uncertainty prevails, a
strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats is optimal. Actors applying this
strategy study the actions of their adversariesover multiple rounds
without issuing an immediate response. Only when the actor is
convinced that the adversary intentionally defects, will the actor
issue a disproportionately forceful response. The laws of war,
criminal law, and internationalsales law all face some situations
of uncertainty. This Article argues that each of these legal fields
adopts a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats to address conditions
of acute uncertainty.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The rule of law depends on several foundational principles: the
procedures that determine the existence of a legal.breach and the
form of the legal retaliation must be clear,1 wrongdoers can be
punished only after they violate the law, 2 and the response used
against them must be proportional to the gravity of the breach3 and
issued close to the time of the breach itself.4 These principles

1.
See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63-65 (rev. ed. 1969) (arguing
that clarity is a crucial condition for legality).
2.
See id. at 53 (highlighting that while some rules within a system that is
generally prospective can profitably have a retroactive effect, designing a legal
system that is entirely retroactive is unthinkable, because law is intended to direct
human conduct).
3.
See VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CRIMINAL LAW 331-34 (2011) (explaining that the right to cause only a proportional
harm to the harm caused to you or to the harm you can prevent by punishment is a
general principle that underlies many fields of the law, including the laws of war
and criminal law); Thomas A. Franck, On Proportionalityof Countermeasures in
International Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 715, 715-16 (2008) (suggesting that the
general principle that countermeasures for transgressions must be proportional
runs through the law, covering areas as different as the laws of war, constitutional
law, and trade law).
4.
See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 13-14
(1998). A statute of limitations-preventing criminal prosecution after a set period
of time-is a procedural principle that underlies criminal law. It is justified as a
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concur with the attributes of a tit-for-tat strategy, a strategy that
was found to lead to cooperation between parties in a variety of
situations. A tit-for-tat strategy is clear (easy to understand), nice
(does not defect first), retaliatory (responds immediately), and
forgiving (responds proportionately).5
Consider the rule that a country may respond to hostilities
directed against it by another country that do not amount to an
"armed attack" only with steps that are immediate, necessary, and
proportional. 6 Or the rule that allows only proportional responses
7
as a countermeasure even against an armed attack. These are
clear examples of a tit-for-tat strategy. In interactions between
well-organized countries of similar strength, this strategy allows
each country to gauge the intentions of the other, promoting
cooperation and preventing deterioration into war.
But in interactions between a stronger, well-organized country
and a weaker country that cannot control militants acting from its
own territory, a tit-for-tat rule can lead to a cycle of attacks and
counterattacks. The stronger country may mistake hostilities by
militants acting from the territory of the weaker country as
deliberate attacks by the weaker country. If the stronger country
responds immediately, the weaker country may retaliate, and both
countries will spiral into a series of counterreprisals culminating in
war.
If, however, countries were allowed to delay their response as
they analyzed the actions and intentions of the other country and
after a while respond with disproportionate force, the deterioration
may be prevented. Furthermore, future aggression can be
prevented by incapacitating or weakening the enemy, not just by
deterring it. If a stronger country is allowed to use disproportionate
force, it can minimize the ability-not only the motivation--of the
weaker country to harm it. What is needed to serve these goals is
simply a doctrine of many-tits-for-many-tats.
Developments in the international laws of war follow this
logic. They allow a country to accumulate several small attacks
against it that do not individually constitute an "armed attack" and
8
treat them all as an armed attack that deserves a strong response.
Furthermore, even a response to an armed attack is constrained by
some level of proportionality, but states can aggregate several
armed attacks, using the so-called "pin-pricks" doctrine, and
respond to all of them together with a force far greater than that
mandated by each individual attack. 9

check on the state's powers of investigation and prosecution without reflecting on
the morality of the criminal act itself. Id.
See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 54 (1984).
5.
See infra Part III.A.
6.
7.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.A.
8.
See infra Part III.B.
9.
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Criminal law offers another example of this dynamic. Usually,
criminal sanctions are directed at a specific violation of the law and
are proportional to the gravity of the violation. The state therefore
uses a tit-for-tat strategy against potential offenders. Some
jurisdictions, however, adopt disproportionate penalties against
repeat offenders that are intended to remove such offenders from
society for a very long time. One form of escalating punishments for
repeat offenders is the so-called "three-strikes-and-you're-out"
rule.10 These rules are directed against recidivist offenders that
chose a life of crime and are likely to commit more crimes in the
future if released (career offenders). The ability to aggregate
information over several offenses before a disproportionate
response is used allows the state to separate these career offenders
from offenders who committed a single offense without adopting
crime as a way of life. Even if the state knows that an accused
committed an offense with certainty, it is only the accumulation of
offenses that allows the state to know this crime is not a result of a
mistake or a one-time opportunity, but rather the actions of a
career offender.
A third strike can separate a career offender from society and
incapacitate his ability to commit more crimes. 1 1 The
disproportionate response that is meted out as a "third strike"
might deter potential career offenders from committing even their
first crime because they know they may not be able to avoid
committing crimes in the future and therefore a first crime
increases the chances that they will end up suffering this greater
penalty. 12
International sales law offers another example for a legal
regime that is generally committed to proportional responses. The
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (CISG) 13 allows a party to an international business
contract to respond to a breach by the other party in a proportional

10.
he most severe and the most famous "three strikes and you're out" law is
probably the one that went into force in California in March 1994. This law counts
as a "strike" every conviction for a serious or violent felony (some examples include
murder, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary committed in an occupied house, drug
sale to minors, or a felony committed with a deadly weapon). A criminal with one
"strike" who is convicted of any later felony-even if it is not a "strike"-will face a
doubling of the sentence for the later conviction and cannot be released before 80
percent of that sentence is served. A criminal with two "strikes" convicted of any
additional felony will face a prison sentence of 25 years to life and cannot be released
before serving 80 percent of the 25-year term. See Eric Helland & Alexander
Tabarrok, Does Three Strikes Deter? A Non-Parametric Estimation, 42 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 309, 309-10 (2007). Many other states have passed similar laws to
which the same analysis applies, see Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike:
The Full Deterrent Effect of California's Two- and Three-strikes Legislation, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 159, 159-60 (2002).
11.
See infra Part IN.B.
12.
See infra Part IV.C.
13.
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, art. 50, April 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG].
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manner. 14 If the breach is fundamental, the damaged party can
avoid the contract, releasing it from all its contractual
obligations. 15 If the breach is not fundamental, the damaged party
can only take certain countermeasures that are proportional to the
16
In
gravity of the breach and intended to save the contract.
17
damages.
for
side
addition, it can also sue the other
Nevertheless, if a seller-in breach of the agreement-does not
deliver the goods on time, the buyer may set an extended period for
fulfilling the contract. The buyer has to inform the seller of this
18
extended period in what is known as a "Nachfrist Notice." If the
seller does not deliver within the extended period, the buyer can
avoid the contract, thereby responding disproportionately to a
continuing violation even if it does not constitute a fundamental
breach. The grace period given to the seller allows the buyer to
gauge the seller's intentions before issuing that disproportionate
response.19
These examples demonstrate that legal systems often have a
preference for immediate and proportional responses and, by this,
favor a tit-for-tat strategy. This Article argues that in some
uncertainty-a
of
conditions
in
situations-particularly
disproportionate and delayed response is preferable as it can deter
more effectively and prevent the ability to commit future violations.
A strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats that allows the responder to
aggregate several wrongful actions toward it before it responds
with a strong sanction may therefore be sometimes preferable. This
analysis justifies and explains certain legal regimes that contradict
the predominant tit-for-tat strategy.
Part II describes the tit-for-tat strategy, the game theory that
supports its use, and the situations in which it will lead to
inefficient results. Part III presents the laws of war that usually
prevent countries from responding disproportionately to hostilities
against them and reviews several cases in which a disproportionate
response is nevertheless legal. Part IV presents the benefits of
disproportionate penalties for repeat offenders in criminal law.
Part V reviews a disproportionate response to breach of contract in
international sales law as an exception to the general proportional
responses allowed by the CISG. Part VI concludes.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra Part V.B.
CISG, supra note 13, art. 49(1)(a), 64.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.B.
CISG, supra note 13, art. 47(1), 49(1)(b).
See infra Part V.C.
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TIT-FOR-TAT STRATEGY AND ITS WEAKNESSES

In some situations, cooperation is a strategically wise choice:
all drivers are better off driving on the right side of the road in New
York and on the left side of the road in London. These situations
are known in game theory as coordination games. 20 They only
require a good source of information and a little patience to lead
rational players to cooperative behavior that is beneficial to both of
them.2 1
Unfortunately, not all situations in life can be modeled as a
coordination game. There are situations in which the rational thing
for both parties to do is to betray each other. The most notorious
situation of this kind is known as the prisoner's dilemma. The
metaphor behind the prisoner's dilemma is a story in which two
accomplices are caught in the middle of a crime. The police put
them in separate rooms and make each the same exact offer: "Ifyou
choose to rat on your friend and he stays silent, you will get out
without a penalty and your friend will stay in prison for a very long
time. If you confess and so does your friend, you will both get a
couple of years in prison. If you both stay silent, you will both go to
prison for only one year. Finally, remember that we made your
friend the same offer." 22
A rational prisoner would quickly realize that the smart thing
to do is always to rat on his partner. If the partner stays silent, the
snitch would go home scot-free. If the partner confesses, telling the
police what you know can reduce your penalty from many years to
just a couple of years in prison. Given that both prisoners are
rational and egoist, they would always betray each other. 23
The tragic thing about the prisoner's dilemma is that if both
prisoners confess, they would both go to prison for a couple of years.

&

20.
See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11-12 (2005) (explaining that one of the reasons countries
respect international borders is simply coordination-the countries want to avoid
conflict and they do not have a particular interest to increase their border at the
expense of their neighbor); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54
(1960) (giving examples of strategic coordination in everyday life); Tom Ginsburg
Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of
InternationalDispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1244-45 (2004)
(Describing games of pure coordination-such as the decision on which side of the
road to drive-and distinguishing them from mixed motive games in which parties
have both shared and conflicting interests. Many disputes between nations can be
modeled as mixed motive games).
21.
See SCHELLING, supra note 20, at 57 (suggesting that people who want
to coordinate around a choice can usually do so even absent communication by
discerning clues or "focal points" using their imagination and prior information
about each other); David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and JudicialReview,
97 GEO. L.J. 723, 757-64 (2009) (explaining how courts can solve coordination
problems by providing a "focal point" that parties can coordinate around to avoid a
conflict).
22.
See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME
THEORY AND THE LAW 33 (1994) (describing the prisoner's dilemma with slightly
different values that follow the same logic).
23.
Id. at 34.
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They could have each spent just one year in prison if only they
cooperated and decided to keep their lips sealed. When the game is
played only once, however, this cooperation is impossible because
both parties have an incentive to betray each other regardless of
what their partner chooses to do. 2 4
But when the prisoner's dilemma game is played multiple
times, cooperation can certainly emerge. 2 5 Both parties can realize
that defecting may mean they get a bigger reward for this round,
but it can also provoke the other side to defect in future rounds. In
contrast, being nice this time around may mean you gain only a
small reward, but it can motivate the other party to play nice in the
future. 2 6
This does not mean that it pays to play nice all the time.
Nobody wants to be the sucker and lead the other side to think that
it can always take advantage of your kindness. Clearly, a good
strategy needs to react to the actions of the other party and to try
to maximize your own rewards, knowing that the other side does
the same. The question is how to do that. What is the best strategy
to play the prisoner's dilemma game?
A. When Tit-for-Tat Is Optimal
Political scientist Robert Axelrod offered a practical solution
to this problem. He constructed a tournament for computer
programs that played multiple rounds of a bilateral game with

Id.
24.
See KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 71-76
25.
(2007). If a prisoner's dilemma is played for a set number of times, parties will still
not cooperate because everyone knows that in the last round defection would occur,
which means that defection is the smart strategy in the round before that, and so
on using backward induction until the beginning. However, cooperation can emerge
in an indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. The insight that parties can
cooperate in an indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is so famous and
uncontroversial that it is known as a "folk theorem." Id.
A similar problem to the prisoner's dilemma only with multiple members
instead of two parties is the so-called "tragedy of the commons." The tragedy of the
commons is exemplified in situations in which farmers share a common grazing
ground. For each farmer, it pays to have more cows using the common pool, no
matter what the others do. But if all farmers add more cows, the grass will not
regenerate and all the cattle will die. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of
the Commons, SCI. MAG., Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243. Scholars have shown that multipleplayer prisoner's dilemmas can also be solved when the parties are able to cooperate
and prevent free riding by other players. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 33-34 (1965)
(explaining that small groups are better able to prevent free riding than bigger
groups, because in small group each member gains enough from cooperation to have
an incentive to enforce cooperation on other members); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING
THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 6-14
(1990) (explaining that in real life situations people can change the rules of multipleplayer prisoner's dilemmas and foster cooperation; by empirically studying
successful cases of cooperation, the conditions that allow cooperation to emerge can
be distilled).
See BINMORE, supra note 25.
26.
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positive rewards that complied with the prisoner's dilemma logic.
Each program was matched with every one of the others, and the
rewards of all the matches were averaged. 2 7 Scientists tried to win
the tournament by programming all kinds of strategies-some of
them very complicated-but the definitive winner of the
tournament was the tit-for-tat strategy. 2 8
This simple strategy-devised by the Canadian psychologist
Anatol Rapoport-played "cooperate" in the first round, and then
repeated whatever the other party played in the previous move.2 9
The result was that tit-for-tat gained the highest average reward
from all the other programs in almost all iterations of the
tournament. 30
When called upon to account for the unusual success of the titfor-tat strategy, Axelrod explained that it combines four different
qualities that together make it a winner: (1) it is nice enough to
start the game with cooperation, which prevents the less vicious
programs from punishing it with defection; (2) it is retaliatory,
which convinces the other programs not to try to take advantage of
it; (3) it is forgiving, which helps it to avoid an endless spiral of
reprisals, at least in some situations; and (4) it is clear enough to
be understood by the other programs, which is a prerequisite for
long-term cooperation. 3 1
B. A Delayed Response Deals Well with Noise
Now imagine that you take away tit-for-tat's last and most
important advantage: its clarity. Everybody can understand tit-fortat because every one of its actions is accurately registered by its
opponent who quickly figures out the strategy behind it. What if
you added some noise to the system? If tit-for-tat plays "cooperate"
but the game-master manipulates its actions into a "defect,"
cooperation can break down pretty easily. To take a simple
example: two friendly tit-for-tat programs in this predicament will
fall into an endless vortex of defections, just because of a single
manipulation.32
Tit-for-tat benefits from being clear to its opponents, but it also
benefits from its ability to quickly retaliate toward offenses and to
quickly forgive an opponent who shifts back to cooperative

27.
AXELROD, supra note 5, at vii-viii.
28.
Id. at viii.
29.
Id.
30.
Id. at 48.
31.
Id. at 54.
32.
If both programs are manipulated to defect at the same round, they
would both respond by defecting in all future rounds. If program A defects once,
program B would respond by defection in the next round. While in the next round
program A would again cooperate, copying the actions of program B in the previous
round, program B would now defect. The round after that program A would defect
in response, while program B would play cooperate. This weird sequence of
cooperate-defect pairs would go on indefinitely unless there are future
manipulations. See AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THE ART OF STRATEGY
76 (2008).
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behavior. Adding noise makes tit-for-tat's quick response time into
a disadvantage. The noise added into the system can mistakenly
provoke tit-for-tat to defect. Many adversary programs would not
take tit-for-tat's defection lying down and would respond by
defecting in later rounds.
Scholars have experimented with "noisy" tournaments to
determine which strategy is superior in conditions of uncertaintywhen the true actions of adversaries are not known for sure. One
group of scholars invited experts to send programs to compete in a
tournament quite similar to Axelrod's tournament, only with an
element of noise that would overrule the choices of the programs in
some randomly selected rounds of the game. To make things more
interesting, the tournament allowed each player to choose the level
of cooperation between zero and one hundred in every round
instead of making a binary choice to defect or cooperate, while still
33
preserving payoffs that form the prisoner's dilemma. The result:
tit-for-tat placed eighth out of thirteen programs submitted to the
34
As one would
tournament, a very poor performance indeed.
suspect, tit-for-tat spiraled into unnecessary circles of reprisals
because its reactions are immediate. In a noisy environment,
immediate responses fail.
Who won this noisy tournament? The winner was a program
called "nice-and-forgiving." This program did not react immediately
to every case of noncooperation. Instead, it continued to cooperate
fully as long as the cooperation level of its adversary did not fall
below a certain threshold. The program even ignored a single case
of extreme defection to study whether its opponent would continue
this militant line. 35 The logic behind the winning program was to
retaliate only when it was convinced that the opponent's defection
36
was intentional and not simply noise.
When "nice-and-forgiving" played with an identical program
in the noisy environment, their average cooperation level was
ninety-nine out of one hundred: close to perfection despite the
noise.3 7 In contrast, a "tit-for-tat" playing against itself averaged
seventy-one out of one hundred, reflecting the spiral of unnecessary
38
More generally, generous
reprisals generated by the noise.
programs in the noisy tournament that did not rush to punish their

Jonathan Bendor, Roderick M. Kramer & Suzanne Stout, When in
33.
Doubt...Cooperationin a Noisy Prisoner'sDilemma, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 691, 694
(1991).
Id. at 696.
34.
See id. at 707-09 (giving a description of the strategy). This nice strategy
35.
even dropped its cooperation gradually when the opponent fell below the threshold.
In addition, the "forgiving" part of this strategy was manifested by going back to
play full cooperation when the adversary passed certain thresholds of cooperative
behavior. See id. at 697.
See id. at 706.
36.
See id. at 697.
37.
Id. at 696-97.
38.
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adversary for low levels of cooperation did better than programs
that were more retaliatory.3 9 The longer the game continued, the
more chances there were for vengeance resulting from noise.
Therefore, retaliatory programs would do worse and worse
compared to generous ones. 4 0
The results of the noisy tournament described here were
repeated in other experiments. The literature confirmed that when
there is uncertainty about the behavior of the other side, it is better
not to respond immediately and with the same level of defection. 4 1
It is better to give the other side the benefit of the doubt.
C. Using Stronger Penalties to Sustain Deterrence
One constraint of the tournaments described above, however,
is a bit misleading. In the tournaments, players are stuck with
their opponents for as long as the gamemaster decided in advance.
Real life is not like this. If somebody rips us off repeatedly, we are
entitled to stop doing business with him. A disproportionate
response may simply be a way of terminating a bad relationship.
The example from international sales law is instructive. If
delaying the response allows a contractor to make sure that her
interlocutor cannot be trusted, the best response is to cut the
connection and annul the deal. This may be a disproportionate
response, but its purpose is not to punish or to deter, just to prevent
any further harm.
Another constraint of the tournaments described above is that
the actions of each player are known only to its adversary. Other
players cannot learn the behavior of actors they did not interact
with. They cannot be deterred by a program that acts aggressively
vis-a-vis its adversary. Programs cannot build a reputation that
exceeds the program they are currently paired with.
In contrast, every criminal system realizes that the main
objective of criminal law is to deter potential criminals. 4 2 Once the
crime has already been committed, it may cost more to punish the
criminal than the gains society would achieve from incapacitating
his ability to commit crimes or from his rehabilitation. However,
the penalty may deter other potential criminals from committing
similar crimes because they want to avoid a similar punishment.

39.
Id. at 701.
40.
Id. at 706.
41.
See Jianzhong Wu & Robert Axelrod, How to Cope with Noise in the
Iterated Prisoner'sDilemma, 39 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 183, 185 (1995). In a repetition
of Axelrod's tournament with 1 percent of noise-turning defection into cooperation
and cooperation into defection-the highest score was reached by a "generous"
version of tit-for-tat that cooperates 10 percent of the time when a simple tit-for-tat
would defect. Generosity is intended specifically to break the cycle of reprisals. Id.
42.
See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of CriminalLaw, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 1193, 1205-14 (1985) (discussing the deterrent function of criminal law
using economic analysis).
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To the extent that potential criminals are rational agents, they
will commit crimes only if the benefits from the crime outweigh the
costs of suffering the penalty multiplied by the probability of being
punished. 43 The generosity manifested in letting certain crimes go
without punishment may be necessary to ensure that only career
offenders are punished, but at the same time it reduces the
probability for all criminals of being punished for their crimes. The
simple solution to get the optimal level of deterrence-envisioned
already by Gary Becker, who pioneered the rationalist view of
44
criminals-is to increase the magnitude of the penalty. Other
things being equal, increasing the magnitude of the penalty will
compensate for the lower probability of punishment to reach the
45
optimal level of deterrence.
But what if the punishment is very costly for the punisher? In
the example of a powerful country facing smaller enemies, war may
be useful to degrade the military capacity of its rivals and it may
also serve as a deterrent for future aggressors, but it is extremely
costly and dangerous. Imagine a situation in which a powerful
country is surrounded by ten militant groups. It is not able to
incapacitate all of them at a reasonable cost. If all ten militias
attack it at the same time, the country would not be able to initiate
a full war against all of them without suffering unacceptable losses.
Is a disproportionate counterattack even an option for a country in
this predicament?
For the threat of a disproportionate attack to be effective, it
must be credible. Traditional game theory thinking would not
generate a credible threat under the conditions described above.
The reason is that if nine militias attack the country, the country
does not have an incentive to initiate a full-scale war against the
tenth militia because this war would not deter anybody else
anyway. This makes sure that the tenth militia would decide to
attack. That implies, in turn, that when militia number nine
decides whether to attack or not, it can be guaranteed that militias
one to eight as well as militia number ten would all choose to
attack, giving the state no incentive to initiate a war against it.
Militia number nine would therefore choose to attack, giving
exactly the same incentive to militia number eight and so on, in a
process known as "backward induction." This process would
continue until all militias choose to attack. Under this logic, the
powerful country does not have any credible threat that can deter
its enemies.
Nevertheless, as Reinhard Selten demonstrated in what he
called "the chain store paradox," human beings tend to behave in

See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of
43.
Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 47-48 (2000).
See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
44.
Approach, J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
See id. at 180-85.
45.
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situations such as these using limited rationality that contradicts
the logic of backward induction. 4 6 For the powerful country, the
right thing to do is to fight extremely aggressively against the first
militia that attempts an attack. This will take that militia out of
the game and send a deterring message to all the others. Even if
the militias know that the powerful country cannot initiate a war
against all of them at the same time, they may all be effectively
deterred.
The upshot of this analysis is that once delaying the response
guarantees a high probability of identifying an intentional attack,
a disproportionately strong counterstrike is mandated. Sometimes
the disproportionate counterstrike would prevent the possibility of
future transgressions. If that is not possible, it may optimize
deterrence given that some intentional attacks would go
unpunished. Even if there is no credible threat to respond
disproportionately to all future attacks, a disproportionate
counterstrike may be the only effective deterrent, which works
because of the limited rationality of human behavior.
To sum up, in conditions of uncertainty, an immediate reaction
may lead to harmful and unnecessary reprisals. The smart thing to
*dois to delay the response until enough information is gathered to
discern that offenses are intentional. But then the counterattack
must be disproportionately strong to incapacitate or to effectively
deter the transgressor and other possible transgressors. The
following Parts demonstrate how this logic works out in different
areas of the law.

III.

PROPORTIONALITY AND THE LAWS OF WAR

On May 26, 2015, a large rocket exploded in the southern
Israeli town of Gan Yavne. 4 7 The explosion caused a fifteen-yearold girl severe anxiety and she was evacuated to a nearby
hospital. 4 8 This was the very first time a rocket of this size and
range was fired from Gaza since the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict, also
known as Operation Protective Edge. 4 9 During that operation,
more than 4,500 rockets and mortar bombs were fired at Israel.

46.
See Reinhard Selten, The Chain Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION
127, 127-33 (1978). When a chain store faces potential competition by local stores
in many different cities, it can use predatory pricing to fight off the opening of
competitor stores in these cities, but it cannot lower prices to fight potential
competitors in all the cities at the same time. Just like in the example described
above, backward induction would suggest that competitors would arise in all the
cities, but a deterrence theory that decides to fight aggressively against the first
competitors may deter all competitors from entering the market. Id.
47.
See Matan Zuri et al., First Since ProtectiveEdge: GradFiredfrom Gaza.
The IDF Attacked in the Gaza Strip, YNETNEWS (May 27, 2015),
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/O,7340,L-4661653,00.html
[https://perma.cclH6A5TWTK] (archived Aug. 16, 2018).
48.
See id.
49.
See id.
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Sixty-eight Israeli soldiers and five civilians were killed, while
Palestinian casualties totaled more than 2,100.50
Nobody on the Israeli side knew exactly who fired the rocket,
which broke the long silence following the recent catastrophic
conflict. 5 1 Rockets of this size are held and even locally produced
by the military wing of Hamas, the organization that controls the
Gaza strip. 5 2 Israelis assessed that the leadership of Hamas feared
53
the grave consequences of another conflict with Israel. But the
military wing of Hamas was more aggressive and may have tried
54
Nevertheless, it is also
to provoke Israel by firing the rocket.
possible that the rocket was fired by a competing organization
55
called Islamic Jihad, which is financed by Iran. The leadership of
this smaller organization was probably also interested in
preserving the ceasefire, but some armed groups within the
56
organization may have wanted to take a more militant line.
Finally, it is also possible that the rocket was fired by some splinter
57
group from the extremely radical Islamic Salafi movement. These
fanatic groups fight a bloody war against Hamas, which arrested
many of their men. 5 8 They may have had an interest in plunging
59
Hamas into a conflict with Israel to revenge these arrests.
What should Israel have done? Preserving the deterrence
against Hamas was crucial. It was the only way to ensure an end
to the rocket fire on Israeli cities. If Israel would have known for
sure that Hamas was responsible for this rocket, a proportional

The exact number of Palestinian casualties and the proportion of civilian
50.
casualties to militants killed are fiercely debated. See ANNEX-PALESTINIAN
FATALITY

FIGURES
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THE

2014

GAZA

CONFLICT

A-2

(2014),

http://mfa.gov.il/ProtectiveEdge/Documents/PalestinianFatalities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X2AU-XTCR] (archived Aug. 16, 2018) (noting that 44 percent of
the Palestinian casualties were militants); Paul Farhi, Reporters Grapple With
Politics, Erratic Sources in Reporting Israeli/GazaDeath Toll, THE WASH. POST
(Aug. 4,. 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/reporters-grapplewith-politics-erratic-sources-in-reporting-israeligaza-deathtoll/20 14/08/04/
c02ab282- 1cl0- 1 1e4-ae540cfelf974f8a-story.html?noredirect=on&utmterm=
.40c76e5453e3 [https://perma.cc/9D6D-6GBA] (archived Aug. 6, 2018); Ministry:
Death Toll from Gaza Offensive Topped 2,310, MA'AN NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 3, 2015),
[https://perma.cc/722Thttp://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?id=751290
2MRW] (archived Aug. 5, 2018) (reporting that Palestinian deaths totaled over
2,300).
Ron Ben-Yishai, Challenging the Leadership of Israel and Hamas,
51.
YNETNEWS (May 26, 2015), www.ynet.co.illarticles/0,7340,L-4661681,00.html
[https://perma.ccR89H-DNFV] (archived Aug. 16, 2018).
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
Id.
59.
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counterstrike would be the logical thing to do to maintain
deterrence. 60 This is what the tit-for-tat strategy recommends. 6 1
Given the uncertainty about the identity of the shooters,
however, a tit-for-tat strategy would be a problematic choice. What
if the rocket was fired by groups that only wanted to weaken
Hamas by provoking an Israeli response? And what if Hamas is
provoked by an Israeli response and retaliates by firing more
rockets? The entire situation can easily escalate into war.
If, however, Israel would decide not to retaliate-or to strike
back in a way that would not cause much harm to Hamas and
would likely not lead to a counterstrike-long-term deterrence may
suffer. Hamas may use the uncertainty about its actions to strike
Israeli cities whenever it wants. Therefore, if Israel decides not to
respond to each individual strike, it must make clear to Hamas that
every rocket is registered. Once enough transgressions accumulate
to make it absolutely clear that Hamas has fired or supports the
firing of rockets, Israel will respond with disproportionate forcemuch greater than that mandated by each individual strike.
Expecting that, Hamas will hopefully be deterred. Furthermore, if
Israel initiates such a powerful counterstrike it can significantly
degrade the military abilities of Hamas, by hitting munition silos,
arms factories, and military personnel. This would make it
physically impossible for Hamas to launch intensive strikes against
Israeli citizens in the future. 6 2 In other words, what is required
from Israel is a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats.
Would such a strategy be legal under international law? Every
real-life example presents many unique features which raise
specific legal questions, 6 3 but the issue of military counterstrikes
under conditions of uncertainty is not unique to Israel. The United
States and other countries participating in the war on terror face a

60.
Cf. Alon Cohen & Raphael Bitton, The Threshold Requirement in
Asymmetric Conflicts: A Game Theory Analysis, 16 CHI. J. INT'L L. 43, 48, 78 (2015)
(showing through game theory that a swift military response to terrorism by a
powerful country against a weaker adversary can minimize terror attacks, but also
noting that this solution often does not occur because parties are able to
communicate and negotiate alternative solutions).
61.
See AXELROD, supra note 5, at 79-80. Retaliation for attacks deterred the
enemy and ensured some level of coexistence between the enemy sides in the
trenches of World War I. The soldiers usually responded with a more extreme strike
than the attack targeting them. However, because not every bullet fired actually hit
its target and because the other side noted that the counter-attack is a retaliation,
escalation was often prevented. Id.
62.
One concentrated attack has another advantage over many small
skirmishes for the stronger country: the longer the hostilities continue, the better
the weaker army becomes and the greater the disintegration of the stronger army.
See Martin van Creveld, Power in War, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 5-8 (2006)
(explaining that the weaker side always learns and evolves as it finds a stronger
enemy, whereas the stronger enemy backslides both because it does not face military
challenges and because it will inevitably be portrayed as either a villain or
incompetent).
63.
For a discussion of many of the unique legal problems of the IsraelHamas conflict see HAMAs, THE GAZA WAR AND AcCOUNTABILITY, UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAw (Mark Ami-El ed., Jerusalem Ctr. for Pub. Affairs 2011).
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very similar predicament. To accommodate the need of these
countries, international law is evolving. Doctrines are forming that
allow states to wait instead of responding immediately and then to
strike back with a force proportionate to the aggregate of all
transgressions but wildly disproportionate to each individual
transgression. Such doctrines are the subjects of the next subparts.
A. "ArmedAttack" and the Accumulation Doctrine
The laws of war are divided into two categories: (1) jus ad
bellum: the laws that set the conditions under which countries may
use armed force or fight a legal war and (2) jus in bello: the laws
that regulate the conduct of armies during war. Before
investigating the types of military actions armies can employ at
war under jus in bello, countries must make sure that the use of
force is at all legal under jus ad bellum.
The most fundamental rule of jus ad bellum is enshrined in
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. It declares that
countries "shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
64
But this rule has an important
independence of any state[.]"
exception: countries have the right to use self-defense in response
65
to an "armed attack" according to Article 51 of the Charter.
An "armed attack" means the use of force by entering the
66
territory of another country or firing weapons across the border.
However, to constitute an armed attack, this assault must be of
67
Scholars have disputed the exact
some minimal level of gravity.
scale and effects that are necessary to form an armed attack, but
even scholars setting a very low threshold usually require some
68
threshold of severity to classify an assault as an armed attack.
This means, of course, that some assaults could occur that
would not count as armed attacks. Countries are not allowed to use
self-defense in response to such assaults. But must the victims of
these assaults sit and do nothing? Not exactly. Countries are
allowed to respond by taking measures that are similar to self69
defense but do not reach the same level of intensity. The view of
some international lawyers is that countries are allowed to

U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
64.
Id. art. 51; see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF65.
DEFENCE 197 (6th ed. 2017) (discussing Article 51).
DINSTEIN, supranote 65, at 208.
66.
Id. at 206.
67.
Id. at 209-11; cf. David Kretzmer, The InherentRight of Self-Defence and
68.
Proportionalityin Jus Ad Bellum, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 235, 242-43 (2013) (referring
to some scholars that require different thresholds of severity to constitute an armed
attack and to some sources that do away with this requirement altogether).
See DINSTEIN, supranote 65, at 207 (discussing the International Court
69.
of Justice holding that such lawful measures that are similar but less grave than
self-defense are allowed).
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retaliate against assaults that fall short of armed attacks with force
which falls short of self-defense. 70 The retaliation must be strictly
necessary, proportionate, and immediate in time.7 1
This doctrine of retaliation possesses the qualities of the titfor-tat strategy. The doctrine allows countries to swiftly respond in
kind to attacks against them and creates a perfect deterrent in
situations of symmetric rivals with full information. However,
when countries are not sure who attacked them-a common
situation in asymmetric warfare-this tit-for-tat strategy can prove
disastrous. It can plunge both countries into a series of
countermeasures that would quickly escalate into all-out war.
Ignoring incidents short of armed attack is not an option in a
situation of asymmetric warfare either. This would allow the
aggressor to take advantage of the generosity of the victim and
keep launching small attacks with impunity. What is required is a
doctrine of many-tits-for-many-tats and such a doctrine exists
under international law.
Scholars have argued that an accumulation of assaults that
each fall short of an armed attack may collectively constitute an
armed attack. 72 Countries are therefore allowed to study their
opponent and calculate the gravity of all its assaults taken
together. When the combination of all the small assaults reaches
the level of an armed attack, the country may respond by using selfdefense, which implies a much greater ability to use force than the
level allowed for countermeasures
short of self-defense.
International lawyers have therefore formed a strategy of manytits-for-many-tats that allows countries to better address situations
of uncertainty.
B. Jus Ad Bellum Proportionality
Even if a country were subject to an armed attack-whether
through a single big assault or through the accumulation of several
smaller ones-the country does not get license to respond as
intensely as it pleases. An armed attack awakens the right to selfdefense. Self-defense does give a country the right to retaliate much
more forcefully than it could to transgressions that do not
constitute an armed attack, but the scale of the retaliation is still
limited by the rules of jus ad bellum.

70.
Id.
71.
See Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J.
Rep. 161, 331-33 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion by Simma, J.).
72.
See DINSTEIN, supra note 65, at 211 (discussing support for the view that
events can cumulatively equal an armed attack that allows for self-defense);
Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 359, 388
(2009); Cf. Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep.
161, 333 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion by Simma, J.) ("there is in the international law
on the use of force no "qualitative jump" from iterative activities remaining below
the threshold of Article 51 of the Charter to the type of "armed attack" envisaged
there").
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If an attack is in progress, the attacked country is allowed to
use force that is necessary for the purpose of repelling that
attack.7 3 However, scholars have argued that countries are allowed
to use force not just in order to halt an ongoing attack. 7 4 Even after
the attack has ended, another legitimate purpose for using force is
to deter the enemy that initiated the attack from committing future
attacks. 7 5 The enemy must realize that further attacks will be
76
reciprocated and will prove costly for it as well.
When a country sets out to deter future attacks by an
aggressor, it is constrained to retaliate in a manner proportional to
the scale and the effects of the initial attack.7 7 In other words,
scholars limit the response countries are allowed to use against an
78
armed attack by a tit-for-tat rule.
As mentioned regarding incidents falling under the threshold
of an armed attack, in situations that involve two well-governed
and equally powerful states, a tit-for-tat rule may lead to optimal
deterrence and minimize conflicts. Both countries will consider
that their actions will be answered in kind and try to preserve the
peace. However, countries that are facing a much weaker enemy
that cannot fully restrain militants operating from its border are
facing the same dilemma described in the previous subpart.
Responding immediately and with proportionate force may play
into the hands of dissident groups and spark a conflict both sides
would like to avoid. In contrast, ignoring persistent attacks may
easily be abused by a rival country.
What is required is a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats:
delaying the response to the armed attacks, but when several
attacks pile up, issuing a powerful response. Once again,
international lawyers view this reasonable solution as legally
legitimate. Scholars have argued that when a country is subjected
to a series of separate attacks, it is allowed to respond by using one
powerful counterstrike.7 9 Scholars refer to each one in the
80
The response to a
sequence of armed attacks as a "pin-prick."
aggregate effect
to
the
be
proportional
to
needs
series of "pin-pricks"
81
of the entire sequence of attacks.

73.
See Kretzmer, supra note 68, at 269-70.
74. See id. at 268-69.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
See id. at 269, 272.
77.
Id.
78.
Robert Ago (Special Rapporteur to the International Law Commission),
79.
Eighth Report on State Responsibility, T 121, UN Doc. A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7 (1980).
DINSTEIN, supra note 65, at 275.
80.
Id.
81.

1092

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 51.1075

C. Blurring the Lines Between Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello
A final area in which the logic of many-tits-for-many-tats is
echoed by the laws of war concerns the diluting of jus in bello
obligations for countries fighting a just war. Traditionally,
international law drew a sharp distinction between jus ad bellum
andjus in bello obligations. Even if a country is allowed to use force
under jus ad bellum, it is still constrained by jus in bello-for
example, it cannot cause excessive harm to civilian targets even
when pursuing legitimate military objectives. 82
Lately, however, scholars have called for blurring the
dichotomy between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. They realized
that in recent conflicts the international community was willing to
grant extra leeway in the application ofjus in bello rules if the use
of force was particularly justified under jus ad bellum.83 In other
words, when a country fights an especially just war, the
international community tends to accept harsher military methods
as legitimate. 8 4
The potential for abuse engrained in this trend is obvious.
Every country tends to think its cause is just and to use every
ambiguity for its benefit.8 5 Countries could reciprocate the harsh
measures taken against them and dropping the constraint of jus in
bello rules may plunge both sides into committing horrible crimes.
Scholars have realized that and suggest that strict rules like the
prohibition against intentionally killing civilians should not be
bent even when fighting a just war. 86 In contrast, the vague
standards of jus in bello, such as the prohibition against causing
excessive harm to civilians when attacking military targets, are
quite imprecise anyway and they do not provide real protection,
particularly in cases of asymmetric conflicts where both parties are
trying to overwhelm and shock the enemy.8 7 Scholars have
therefore argued that in modern asymmetric conflicts, accepting
the trend which allows harsher methods-challenging the normal
boundaries of jus in bello-when conducting a just war is
recommended.8 8 This trend can give the international community
a fuller and more truthful picture of the military conduct of
countries.89
Relaxing the boundaries between jus ad bellum and jus in
bello can serve a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats. Countries
that hold back and do not respond to repeated attacks can prove to

82.
See FRANCOISE BOUCHET-SAULNIER, THE PRAcTicAL GUIDE TO
HUMANITARIAN LAW 509 (3d English Language ed. 2014).
83.
Eyal Benvenisti, Rethinking the Divide Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus
in Bello in Warfare Against Nonstate Actors, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 541, 544-45 (2009).
84.
Id.
85.
See Ariel Zemach, Indeterminacy in the Law of War: The Need for an
InternationalAdvisory Regime, 43 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 12-13 (2017).
86.
Benvenisti, supra note 83, at 546.
87.
Id.
88.
Id. at 548.
89.
Id.
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the international community that they gave peace a chance and
were forced to go to war against their wishes. Once the
international community views such a country as fighting a just
war, the country may get a special permission to engage in
particularly harsh military tactics, which strain the boundaries of
traditional jus in bello doctrines.

The analysis in this Part suggests that while the laws of war
traditionally embrace a tit-for-tat strategy, they tend to accept a
strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats, particularly in situations of
asymmetric warfare where such a strategy is recommended by a
game theoretical analysis. Countries subject to assaults that do not
constitute an armed attack are usually constrained to strictly
proportional responses. But these countries can accumulate many
assaults and view them together as an armed attack, opening the
door to a much harsher response while executing the right to selfdefense. When a country is subject to repeated armed attacks, it
can respond with disproportionate force that equals the aggregate
severity of the entire series of attacks launched against it. Finally,
a country that restrained itself in the face of numerous attacks may
be viewed as fighting a just war. There are powerful voices in the
international community calling to release such a country from
some jus in bello obligations, allowing an extreme military
response.

IV. DISPROPORTIONATE PENALTIES FOR REPEAT OFFENDERS

The most fundamental tenet of criminal law is that criminals
can only be punished after they have been convicted of a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.9 0 In other words, criminal punishment
is only justified when a court is certain that the accused committed
a crime. The entire premise of this Article is that a strategy of
many-tits-for-many-tats is useful in situations when punishment is
meted out under conditions of uncertainty. Are such conditions
even relevant for criminal law?
There have been theoretical suggestions to modify the system
that requires a high threshold of certainty before any criminal
penalty is justified. Some scholars have suggested combining the
probabilities that a suspect committed several distinct crimes to
deduce that he committed at least one unspecified crime beyond the
required threshold of certainty. 9 ' Others have suggested adjusting
the level of punishment to the degree of certainty that a suspect
committed a crime instead of requiring a minimal threshold of

See Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Aggregating ProbabilitiesAcross Cases:
90.
Criminal Responsibility for Unspecified Offences, 94 MINN. L. REV. 261, 265 (2009).
See generally id.
91.
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proof.92 Nevertheless, these suggestions are categorically opposed
to the laws existing in most criminal systems.
Traditional criminal law requires a minimal level of certainty
in the sense that the court must be convinced that a specific person
committed a specific crime. The question is why? What will happen
if an innocent man will be convicted of a crime he did not commit?
The answer cannot be based purely on considerations of deterrence.
It may seem intuitive that if an innocent man is convicted,
deterrence will suffer-because his choice between alternative
courses of action will be not guided anymore by the fear of
punishment. However, the picture is a bit more complicated than
that. If a crime has a tangible consequence such as robbery or
murder, the possibility of convicting the wrong person will not
damage the deterrence of potential criminals. If the crime is not
committed, nobody will be convicted, giving potential criminals an
incentive not to commit the crime in order to avoid punishment.
The more distant possibility of being convicted of a completely
different crime committed by somebody else does not change
depending on the potential criminal's actions and therefore does
not damage the incentive not to commit crimes.9 3 Convicting the
innocent will actually damage deterrence only under very refined
and rare conditions. 94
It seems that the reason criminal law is committed to the
requirement of certainty has to be based on non-consequentialist
grounds. It is immoral to punish people for a crime they did not
commit, even if this punishment will lead to beneficial results. At
the same time, when somebody does commit a crime, he incurs a
duty to remedy the consequences of his actions. The criminal
system is therefore allowed to cause harm to true criminals in
pursuit of instrumental goals such as increasing deterrence. 9 5
Scholars that adhere to a strong version of retributivism would
go even further. They would argue that the criminal system is
allowed to punish criminals in a manner proportional to the
severity of the crimes they have committed, and some would say
that the government is required, not only permitted, to issue this
penalty. 96 This strong version of retributivism adopts a tit-for-tat
rule-it envisions the punishment of every crime with a
proportional penalty.

92.
See generally Talia Fisher, Conviction Without Conviction, 96 MINN. L.
REV. 833 (2012).
93.
See generally Henrik Lando, Does Wrongful ConvictionLower Deterrence,
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 327 (2006).
94.
See id. at 332. These conditions include a situation where the legal
system mistakes the nature of the act committed, giving criminals an incentive to
commit a more severe crime instead of a less severe one if that increases their payoff,
for example bringing a real gun instead of a toy gun to a robbery. This analysis is
similar to the problem of marginal deterrence-if the criminal receives a high
penalty anyway, why would he avoid committing a more severe crime? Id.
95.
See TADROS, supra note 3, at 2-4.
96.
See id. at 1-2.
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Every legal system has to deal with some uncertainty. Because
the methods of establishing legal truth are imperfect, some
innocent people will inevitably be convicted and some guilty people
will inevitably be acquitted. The fear of convicting the innocent is
reflected not in denying the possibility of false convictions, but in
the proportion of false convictions to false acquittals that the
system is ready to accept. Scholars have even developed a formula
that finds the connection between the level of certainty required to
convict and the proportional value society puts on these two
mistakes. 9 7 Obviously, the more damaging the conviction of the
innocent and the less damaging the acquittal of the guilty, the more
certainty should be required before conviction. 9 8
Nevertheless, legal systems are generally committed to the
idea that it is mandatory to prove to a high level of certainty that a
criminal committed every act he is punished for. This contradicts
the conditions that call for a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats:
that there is a high level of uncertainty about the commission of
each individual transgression and only the accumulation of several
transgressions attests to the fact that an individual is intentionally
misbehaving.
This Part will therefore not say anything about convicting
people who were not proven guilty beyond the high threshold of a
reasonable doubt. Instead, it draws a distinction between two types
of criminals: "career offenders"-people who chose a life of crimeand "incidental offenders"-people who have committed a crime but
do not intend to pursue crime as a way of life. The legal system is
convinced that both criminals committed the crimes of which they
were convicted. It is legitimate to punish both of them on
retributivist grounds. However, issuing a more severe penalty to
career offenders may be beneficial for society for instrumental
reasons. The strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats is not manifested
by delaying the conviction of criminals for their first criminal acts.
Instead, it is manifested by issuing a much harsher penalty once
several convictions have accumulated, because these repeated
convictions indicate that the crimes were committed by a career
offender. The criminal laws of numerous jurisdictions adopted
doctrinal solutions that follow that logic. 99 This Article will focus
on one such doctrinal solution: the "three-strikes-and-you're-out"
0
rule.1 0
This Part proceeds by first investigating whether it is at all
legitimate on retributivist grounds to distinguish between career
offenders and incidental offenders and to punish the former more
severely. It then draws on empirical evidence and theoretical

See John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the FactfindingProcess, 20 STAN.
97.
L. REV. 1065, 1073-77 (1968).
98.
Id.
See George P. Fletcher, The Recidivist Premium, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS
99.
54, 54-55 (1982).
100. See generally Helland & Tabarrock, supra note 10.
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arguments that concern the activation of the "three-strikes-andyou're-out" rule to establish whether treating career offenders more
harshly can actually reduce crime. This analysis takes into account
the response of criminals to actual or potential penalties and
suggests that criminal law bears some resemblance to the repeated
prisoner's dilemma game described above.
A. Why Career Offenders May Deserve a Higher Penalty
The logic of many-tits-for-many-tats recommends issuing a
much more severe penalty for the last in a series of convictions.
This type of penalty may or may not be beneficial for society; as the
next subparts show, this is a complicated empirical question. But
some retributivists would say that proving that a disproportional
penalty is beneficial for society is not enough to justify it. A penalty
is justified only if it is fair; that is, if the criminal deserves it. Only
after establishing that a penalty is fair is it permitted to ask what
the consequences of punishment are. 10 1
Scholars have reviewed several potential justifications for
disproportionately punishing recidivists. One possibility is to claim
that a person that was already convicted of several crimes and
persists to commit crimes is expressing a clear defiance of the
state's authority, which justifies a harsher penalty. However,
scholars have argued that this ground for punishment is morally
flawed.1 0 2 In a liberal society, punishment is not meted out to
cement the authority of the state as it is in dictatorial regimes.1 03
Although a contrite criminal may receive some leniency from the
state, a defiant criminal does not deserve to be punished more than
a contrite criminal, because his actions were not more
reprehensible. 104
The privilege of the state to be more lenient than the criminal
deserves raises another possibility: perhaps all penalties for nonrecidivists are deliberately lenient and only recidivists get the
punishment they deserve. From this perspective, the punishment
of recidivists is not disproportional to the severity of their crimes;
it only seems out of proportion to the deliberately mild
punishments issued for first-time offenders. It is true that some
jurisdictions use recidivism only as a reason not to be lenient
compared to what an offense deserves. However, many recidivist

101. Michael Davis, Just Deserts for Recidivists, 4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 29, 35
(1985).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 35-36. Even Andrew von Hirsch-who supposedly argued that
a repetitive offender is more culpable because he defies the authority of the statedenied that he made this argument. Von Hirsch clarified that he only suggested
previous convictions could weigh against granting a lenient judgment, which is
justified on other grounds. Id. (citing ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE
CHOICE OF PUNISHMENT (1976)). See also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW 465-66 (2000) (describing Von Hirsch's argument).
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penalties clearly give a disproportionately high penalty for a
repeated offense, and some-like the three-strikes-and-you're-out
rules-do not even aspire for any connection with the last crime
10 5
Unless you
committed, they simply lock somebody up for good.
are committed to the strange proposition that every felony deserves
a life sentence-which would clearly preempt any serious
discussion on the fairness of penalties-this line of argumentation
106
cannot explain many forms of harshness toward recidivists.

The most promising avenue to justify severely punishing
recidivists passes through a peculiar thought-experiment devised
10 7
Imagine that people are
by the philosopher Michael Davis.
in a public auction. This
crimes
to
commit
forced to buy a license
that committing crimes
fact
the
account
strange image takes into
unfair way. People who
an
in
of
society
is a way to take advantage
that govern society and
rules
the
commit crimes gain from breaking
to the damage
proportion
in
that
for
they should be made to pay
more severe
that
they cause to society.108 This logic would dictate
crimes receive more severe penalties. It may also suggest that
recidivists receive a slightly higher penalty, because in order to get
the right to commit multiple crimes they should be made to buy a
special license-a license to buy several licenses to commit
crimes.109

Davis's analysis is helpful, but it can only explain a marginally
higher penalty for recidivists. It cannot even begin to explain laws
a slight
However,
such as three-strikes-and-you're-out.
modification to the rules of the auction would provide a better
justification. In Davis's thought-experiment, the state cannot know
1 10
the identity of the person bidding for the right to commit crimes.
In contrast, his analysis acknowledges the possibility of an auction
where people reveal their true character before they buy the
license. 1 11 If the state can know who the bidder is, it may require
a much higher price for licensing a professional criminal than for
licensing an amateur.1 1 2 The professional criminal may know
much better than a non-professional how to use crime to his
advantage. 1 1 3 Even more importantly, he may get away with many
crimes without getting caught. 11 4 When a professional criminal
11 5
buys a license, the actual damage to society is particularly high.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See Davis, supra note 101, at 31.
See id. at 39.
See generally id.
See id. at 38-39.
See id. at 41-43.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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It is an empirical question whether recidivists are really
professional criminals or not. 1 16 But the possibility that the state
can reveal the character of criminals by observing them over a long
time is exactly what many-tits-for-many-tats is all about. Manytits-for-many-tats is superior in a noisy environment, where the
true actions of adversaries cannot be ascertained with absolute
certainty. Nevertheless, an accumulation of many signals helps
form a picture of the strategy of the adversary. Similarly, when a
person is caught and convicted of several crimes, the state can
deduce that he is a career offender. As the auction metaphor
demonstrates, career offenders deserve a higher penalty, because
their propensity to take advantage of the rest of society is greater
than that of incidental offenders.
All this only implies that career offenders deserve a higher
penalty, but to justify issuing such a penalty it must serve some
consequentialist purpose. 1 1 7 Whether a harder penalty for
recidivists actually helps society is an empirical question, but it can
also be analyzed theoretically based on some plausible
assumptions. The following subparts will investigate the effects of
the three-strikes-and-you're-out laws on incapacitation and
deterrence. This analysis will take into account the cost, of
punishment, which allows for an analogy to Axelrod's tournaments
of the repeated prisoner's dilemma. 11 8
B. IncapacitatingCareer Offenders
The analogy to the repeated prisoner's dilemma is not perfect.
The state and the criminal are not two symmetric opponents. It
would be quite useless to model the strategic responses that
criminals can implement against the far more powerful state.
Nevertheless, the situation as far as the state is concerned does
resemble a repeated prisoner's dilemma in some respects.
In a repeated prisoner's dilemma, it is beneficial to play
cooperate against a friendly but responsive rival program and it is
beneficial to play defect against a program that intentionally
defects against you. In a noisy tournament, the problem is how to
identify which programs are deliberately defecting and which
played cooperate but were manipulated by the game-master.
The parallel between the repeated prisoner's dilemma and
criminal law is that it is useful to treat an incidental offender as a
friendly program and a career offender as an intentionally
defecting program. It is beneficial to release incidental offenders
from prison after a period that is long enough to sustain the regime
of deterrence. Every extra day in prison costs taxpayers a lot of
money for lodging, food, and security, and prevents a citizen from

116. See id. (suggesting that recidivists are not necessarily professional
criminals).
117. See id. at 46.
118. See supra Part II.A.
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working and contributing to society.11 9 In contrast, under some
conditions, it may be useful to keep career offenders incarcerated
for a much longer period in order to incapacitate them-to make it
physically impossible for them to commit more crimes out of prison.
The problem faced by the state is how to identify who is an
incidental offender and who is a career offender so that it can
incapacitate only the latter.
One of the justifications for the three-strikes-and-you're-out
rule is that it can effectively incapacitate career offenders while
avoiding excessive penalties for incidental offenders. If the rule
works, a possibility which many empirical studies have tried to
establish or refute, it can change the selection of prisoners and
ensure that even with the same number of prisoners there will be
a greater proportion of career offenders to incidental offenders
behind bars. 120
Three-strikes-and-you're-out works exactly like a rule of
many-tits-for-many-tats in this respect. The legal system requires
several convictions to be convinced that someone is a career
offender and mete out a very long sentence that would effectively
incapacitate him from committing more crimes. Before several
convictions are accumulated, the penalties will be lower and will
not attempt to incapacitate criminals for long periods. By delaying
the response of the state and gathering information about the type
of the criminal, the efforts of incapacitation can be used more
efficiently.
C. Improving Deterrencefor Career Offenders
Punishing criminals by incarceration is expensive. The
previous subpart suggested that the costs of imprisonment
outweigh the benefits of incapacitation regarding incidental
offenders. In contrast, incapacitation is more useful regarding
career offenders and may actually outweigh the costs of
imprisonment. Nevertheless, it is possible that keeping a man in
prison for the rest of his life is more expensive than the harm he
would cause to society on the loose, even if he is a career offender.
Part of the reason for that is that crimes are usually committed by
young people and the chances that someone will continue to commit
12 1
crimes after a decade or so in prison are small.
119 See Becker, supra note 44, at 180. For an up-to-date assessment of the
costs of incarceration, see Eliza Mills, How Much Does it Cost to Send Someone to
PM),
4:00
2017,
19,
(May
MARKETPLACE
Prison,
https://www.marketplace.org/2017/05/15/world/how-much-does-it-cost-sendsomeone-prison [https://perma.cc/NH4M-YV9A] (archived Aug. 16, 2018).
120. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN,
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 92
(2001) (explaining the argument that three-strikes-and-you're out is useful to
incapacitate specifically the most dangerous criminals, but providing evidence that
incapacitation due to the three strikes rule did not cause the decrease in crime in
California in the nineties).
121. See Shepherd, supra note 10, at 160.
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Still, incarceration of career offenders may ultimately be
beneficial because it can deter other criminals and thus assist in
reducing crime. To determine whether three-strikes-and-you're-out
laws are advantageous, the costs of implementing them must be
weighed against the combined benefits of incapacitation and
deterrence.
A common mistake made when analyzing the deterrent effect
of three-strikes rules is to calculate only the deterrent effect of the
third strike. But where only the third strike is concerned, threestrikes laws may actually have a detrimental effect on deterrence.
Usually, a higher penalty deters more crimes, but there are
situations in which the threat of a severe penalty can actually be
counterproductive. The most common situation of that sort is the
lack of so-called "marginal deterrence" caused by the threat of a
severe penalty. 12 2 For example, if the penalty for armed robbery
with two previous strikes is a life sentence, more criminals would
decide to kill their victims and thus reduce the chances of getting
caught. When a criminal faces the maximum penalty for a crime he
already committed, he cannot be deterred from committing even
worse crimes that can help him escape from the law.
Scholars have argued that three-strikes-and-you're-out laws
fail exactly because they reduce marginal deterrence. 12 3 Criminals
who already have two strikes have an incentive to kill law
enforcement officers, witnesses, or victims to reduce their chances
of getting caught, thereby increasing the rate of homicides. 12 4 This
suggests that if only the deterrence of the third strike is taken into
account, three-strikes laws may actually lead to worse crimes.
But focusing only on the deterrence of criminals with two
previous strikes ignores a crucial part of the picture. People who
consider becoming career offenders must realize that every strike
gets them closer to the third strike and makes a future life sentence
a real possibility. Because they are career offenders, the possibility
that they will be caught for future crimes must loom much larger
for them than for incidental offenders. Empirical research suggests
that this deters potential criminals from committing even their
first or second crime. 12 5

122. There are other conditions in which a high penalty is counterproductive
that are not so relevant here. See generally Saul Levmore & Ariel Porat, Threats
and Criminal Deterrence in Several Dimensions, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1333 (2017)
(discussing the general effects of penalties on the credibility of threats and
blackmailing); Uri Weiss, The Robber Wants to Be Punished (Hebrew Uni. of
Jerusalem, Federman Ctr. for the Study of Rationality, Discussion Paper No. 685,
2015) (discussing the problem of making threats by a criminal to cause further harm
credible because of the penalty he will suffer for the initial offense of issuing an
illegal threat).
123. See Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Lethal Effects of Three
Strikes Laws, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 89, 89-93 (2001) (arguing that three-strikes-andyou're-out laws decrease marginal deterrence and providing evidence that they
increased homicides).
124. Id.
125. See Shepherd, supra note 10, at 162, 174.
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The application of a many-tits-for-many-tats strategy
therefore has a clear downside-a life penalty for the third strike
can damage marginal deterrence and lead to more homicides. At
the same time, three-strikes laws can prevent people from
becoming career offenders by giving them an incentive to avoid
even their first crime. Just like in the noisy tournaments described
above, people know that the state observes their actions. Once the
state is convinced they are career offenders, the penalty will be
severe. Rational people will often be deterred and decide to avoid a
life of crime.
The jury is still out on whether three-strikes laws prevent
more crime through the combined mechanisms of incapacitation
and deterrence.1 2 6 Nevertheless, supporters of such laws can use
the logic of many-tits-for-many-tats to back their position.
Observing the behavior of criminals over several strikes before
subjecting them to a life sentence can both help incapacitate more
career offenders and deter people from becoming career offenders.
In contrast, the strategy of tit-for-tat-a proportional penalty for
every offense-will not distinguish between career offenders and
incidental offenders and therefore will likely do worse in terms of
both deterrence and incapacitation of career offenders.

V. DELAYED RESPONSES IN INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW

Many-tits-for-many-tats is often used by individuals against
each other without the need for a special law or even for a
contract. 127 When a lobsterman sets traps in the territory of his
neighbor, he is usually warned that his actions violate the norms
of the community. 1 28 If warnings do not help and the violations of
territoriality persist, a neighboring lobsterman will inflict
disproportional damage on the transgressor by destroying some of
his lobster traps. 129 Note that the punishing neighbor would not

126. There are many different views on whether better deterrence is reached
when repeat offenders are punished more severely. See Harel & Porat, supra note
90, at 289-90 (providing numerous references to literature on the question). There
are also studies directed specifically at the deterrent effect of three-strikes laws. See,
e.g., Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 10 (comparing the arrests of people who were
released from prison in California in 1994 with two "strikes" to those released with
two trials for strikable offenses but only one conviction that constitutes a strike;
finding that the third strike provisions reduced arrests for criminals with two
strikes by 17 to 20 percent); Cassandra K. Crifasi et al., Effects of State-Level Policy
Changes on Homicide and Nonfatal Shootings of Law Enforcement Officers, 22
INJURY PREVENTION 274, 276 (2016) (finding that three-strikes laws were correlated
with a 33 percent increase in fatal assaults of law enforcement officers).
127. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES 218-19 (1991).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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just take away traps or lobsters-these actions are profitable for
the punisher and can therefore be interpreted as an act of selfinterest instead of a deliberately inflicted sanction. 1 30 Instead, the
neighbor would cause great damage in a way that sends a clear
message. 13 1
Scholars have noted that a similar pattern of warning,
waiting, and finally inflicting disproportional damage on
transgressors appears in numerous community settings. 1 32 This
pattern ensures that only intentional transgressions will be
punished and also that the punishment will be understood as a
deliberate sanction.
When two parties sign a contract, they create a special
relationship which resembles a repeated prisoner's dilemma. In
each round of the game, the seller has an incentive to provide
cheaper and inferior goods and the buyer has an incentive not to
pay fully and on time. But both the seller and the buyer have to
care about the future. If they cheat the other party and get caught,
that party may respond by cheating them in return, damaging their
good name in the industry by bad gossip, or turning to legal
sanctions. A tit-for-tat strategy would be useful to ensure optimal
cooperation between contractors who can fully observe each other's
conduct.
But just like in a noisy tournament, sometimes breaches of the
contract are not intentional. Sometimes, the seller did not know
that the goods were defective or they were damaged during
transit.1 3 3 At other times, a buyer suffered from an unexpected
cash-flow problem and was unable to pay at the agreed-upon
date. 13 4 Contractors who want to continue their fruitful
collaboration should not retaliate against unintentional and
unavoidable infringements. However, simply ignoring previous
infringements would also be a bad strategy as it would allow the
other party to take advantage of one's generosity.
The strategy required is many-tits-for-many-tats: studying the
behavior of the other party and only when it is established that the
cheating is intentional, responding disproportionately. The
following subparts suggest first that contractors actually follow
this strategy and explain how the law can avoid interfering with
their ability to do so. Later, the CISG general strategy of tit-for-tat
responses for breaches of contract is described. An exception to that
strategy, the Nachfrist Notice procedure used in the CISG, is

130. Id.
131. Id. (describing the pattern of a fisherman's gradual escalation of force).
132. See id. at 217-19 (mentioning the example of cattle farmers in Shasta
County and referring to several other examples).
133. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1724, 1775 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein Private Commercial Law].
134. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1808 (1996)
[hereinafter Bernstein Merchant Law].
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explained as an attempt to institutionalize a many-tits-for-manytats strategy for conditions of uncertainty.
A. Non-Legal Sanctions in ContractualRelations
In some lines of business, the chances of inadvertent breach
are high even when the proper precautions have been
implemented. When the product can be easily damaged during
storage or transportation, it is difficult to discern whether the seller
provided a defective product intentionally or not. Scholars have
13 5
argued that the cotton industry is such a market.
Buyers in the cotton industry find themselves in a situation
which resembles a noisy tournament: they cannot know for sure if
the seller intended to defect, or if the goods were damaged against
the seller's will. A game theoretical analysis would recommend a
strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats in situations of this kind.
Instead of responding immediately by ending the business
relationship or using negative gossip against the seller, the buyer
should wait and observe several shipments until it is convinced
that the seller deliberately provides defective goods. Then the
buyer should respond with especially harmful gossip.
Scholars have suggested that business practices concur with
this strategic analysis. Buyers are often willing to forgive several
breaches without retaliation. 13 6 Eventually, when buyers are
convinced that the breaches are intentional, they can gossip
against the sellers in the business community. By issuing wellsubstantiated gossip that records several breaches, the harm
caused to the reputation of the seller is much higher than if the
gossip addressed a single violation. 13 7 Furthermore, the buyer has
to shoulder the costs of issuing such gossip only once instead of
several times. 13 8
The strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats is applied by
contractors without the need for judicial intervention. In fact, some
courts that view the concessions of contractors as a business norm,
139
may
which changes the parties' actual contractual obligations,
that
demonstrated
have
be causing more harm than good. Scholars
they
because
breaches
contractors are willing to ignore several
140
trust each other and want to continue the business relationship.
Forcing contractors who compromised in the past to systematically
overlook all future breaches or to accept breaches even when the

135. See Bernstein Private Commercial Law, supra note 133, at 1775.
136. See id. at 1776.
137. See id. at 1777-79.
138. See id.
139. The attempt to change the parties' obligations according to existing
business norms underlines, for example, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
See Bernstein Merchant Law, supranote 134, at 1766.
140. Bernstein Private Commercial Law, supra note 133, at 1776-77.
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business relationship ended badly would change their incentives
and devastate the ability of contractors to cooperate. 14 1 Parties
would be less likely to let small breaches go without a sanction if a
court can later hold them liable for similar generosity in all future
interactions. 14 2
B. Tit-for-Tat under the CISG
The previous subpart demonstrates that forcing parties by law
to forgive violations just because they did so in the past is a crude
and potentially harmful strategy. Courts often do not possess the
information that is held by the parties and that guides their
strategic responses. They therefore cannot strategize instead of the
parties to the contract. 14 3 However, this does not mean that the
law cannot provide rules that would facilitate the use of many-titsfor-many-tats by contractors. The Nachfrist Notice procedure in the
CISG discussed in the next subpart is such a rule. But this
procedure is an exception to the general regime of the CISG that
promotes a tit-for-tat strategy, a strategy that is efficient under
conditions of certainty.
The CISG-the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods-is an international treaty
designed to introduce a uniform regime that regulates the
international sale of goods. 14 4 International sales sometimes
provide excellent opportunities, but they are fraught with special
challenges. Parties must overcome legal differences across
jurisdictions in addition to differences of business culture and
language.1 4 5 By creating a uniform contractual regime that applies
between all parties from countries that ratified the CISG,1 4 6 the
ability of the parties to predict the rules that will be applied to them
is significantly improved. Predictability increases the ability of the
parties to conclude efficient international deals. 14 7

141. See Bernstein Merchant Law, supra note 134 at 1803-04.
142. See Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 90-92
(2015).
143. See Bernstein Merchant Law, supra note 134, at 1803-04; Bernstein
Private CommercialLaw, supra note 133, at 1776-77.
144. See CISG, supranote 13, art. 7(1).
145. See JOSEPH F. MORRISSEY & JACK M. GRAVES, INTERNATIONAL SALES
LAW AND ARBITRATION: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND COMMENTARY 29-45 (2008)
(describing these and other challenges that arise especially in international sales).
146. See CISG, supra note 13, art. 1(1)(a) (stating that the CISG will apply if
both parties come from countries that ratified the CISG). See also id. art. 1(1)(b)
(stating that the CISG will apply if the rules of private international law lead to the
application of the laws of a country that ratified the CISG, unless that country opted
out of this source of jurisdiction when it ratified the CISG).
147.

See BRUNO ZELLER, CISG AND THE UNIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL

TRADE LAW 27-28 (2007) (discussing the certainty that CISG offers as a uniform
law).
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The CISG is committed to saving contracts in order to salvage
the gains that both parties make from trade. 14 8 That is why a
limited breach of the contract by the seller does not automatically
grant the buyer the right to avoid the contract. Instead, the buyer
can exercise a series of milder sanctions that resemble a tit-for-tat
strategy.
If the seller delivers nonconforming goods, for example, the
CISG allows the buyer to reduce the price only proportionately to
the difference between the value of the goods actually delivered and
14 9
In
the value that conforming goods would have had at that time.
this way, the financial damage that the buyer can cause the seller
equals exactly the damage that the seller caused the buyer. The
same rule of proportional price reduction applies if the seller
150
delivers only a part of the goods.
Most importantly, both parties to the contract can sue for
damages that equal all the losses caused to them by a breach of
contract by the other side. The damages may not exceed the loss
that the breaching party foresaw or ought to have foreseen when
15 1
The tool of suing for damages allows
the contract was concluded.
requiring the other side to
proportionately,
both parties to retaliate
or
negligently caused by the
pay exactly the losses it intentionally
breach.
If the violation committed by a contractor is extreme, it may
constitute a fundamental breach. A breach is considered
fundamental if it substantially deprives a contractor of what it is
entitled to expect under the contract, unless the breaching party
did not foresee this result and a reasonable person would not have
foreseen it. 1 52 A fundamental breach essentially eliminates all the
gains that a party expected to get from the contract. If a party
commits a fundamental breach, the other party is entitled to avoid
the contract. 15 3 This is a proportional response-the breaching
party destroyed all gains for the other party by a fundamental
breach so that party gets to destroy all the gains of the breaching
party from the deal. The tit-for-tat strategy is clearly manifested in
the additional rule that if a party committed a fundamental breach
regarding a specific installment, the other party may declare the
15 4
contract avoided regarding that installment.
The use of tit-for-tat by the CISG is efficient under conditions
of certainty. When both parties are aware of each other's actions, a

148. See Peter Huber, CISG-The Structure of Remedies, 71 RABEL J. COMP.
INT'L PRIVATE L. 13, 28 (2007).
149. See CISG, supra note 13, art. 50.
150. See id. art. 51.
151. See id. art. 74.
152. See id. art. 25.
153. See id. arts. 49(1)(a), 64; see also id. art. 72(1) (stating that if it is clear
that a party will commit a fundamental breach prior to the date of performance, the
other party may avoid the contract).
154. See id. art. 73(1).
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proportional response can deter contractors from committing
violations and save as much as possible of the gains from trade.
C. The Nach/rist Notice Procedure
The Nachfrist Notice rule, in contrast, is designed to deal with
conditions of uncertainty. This rule allows the buyer who faces a
seller that did not deliver on time to set an additional period of
reasonable time by which the seller must perform. If the seller does
not perform within the additional period fixed by the buyer, the
buyer may declare the contract avoided. 15 5
This rule resembles a rule of many-tits-for-many-tats. The
response of avoiding the contract by the buyer is not immediatethe seller gets extra time in which it can perform the contract. The
response is also not proportional because the contract is avoided
even if the breach is not fundamental. Usually, a delayed delivery
does not by itself constitute a fundamental breach. 1 5 6 Avoiding the
contract would destroy all the gains of the seller from the deal.
The Nachfrist Notice rule of many-tits-for-many-tats is ideal
for conditions of uncertainty. Imagine that you are a buyer that
bought some heavy equipment for your factory. The seller was
supposed to deliver the equipment three days ago but did not.
Every day of delay costs money, and the seller does not answer your
calls. Your losses may start mounting soon as without the
equipment you cannot honor your own commitments to customers.
You have no idea if the buyer intends to comply eventually and, if
so, when. Issuing a Nachfrist Notice allows you to deal with this
uncertainty. Within the reasonable time that you set, you will
either receive the equipment you ordered or get the right to avoid
the contract. 157
To sum up, a contractual relationship often looks a lot like a
repeated prisoner's dilemma. In light of that, a tit-for-tat strategy
can be used to maximize cooperation in contracts and constitutes
the main regime adopted by the CISG. However, in situations of
particular uncertainty, a tit-for-tat strategy can lead to too many
mistakes. Merchants facing uncertainty because of potentially
unintentional damage to goods sometimes react by adopting a
strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats.
The Nachfrist Notice
procedure in the CISG is also a form of many-tits-for-many-tats
that can be used in conditions of uncertainty.

155. See id. art. 49(1)(b), 47(1).
156. See MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 145, at 227 (saying Article 47
provides a way for the buyer to limit late deliveries by the seller but does not
typically allow the buyer to declare the contract voided if there is late delivery).
157. See Ericson P. Kimbel, Nachfrist Notice and Avoidance Under the CISG,
18 J.L. & CoM. 301, 301-03 (1999) (describing such a scenario and highlighting the
role of the Nachfrist Notice in providing certainty and predictability).
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CONCLUSION

The path of the law is wiser than the transient people who
walk it. The laws of war, criminal law, and international sales law
have this in common: they all developed over decades by legislators,
judges, and other lawyers who were trying to promote cooperation
and deter wrongdoing. It is little wonder that all these fields exhibit
doctrines that track the fundamental insights of game theory.
Under conditions of certainty, a tit-for-tat strategy is
conducive to promoting cooperation. By allowing immediate and
proportional responses, tit-for-tat effectively deters attempts to
exploit others. This is why tit-for-tat strategies are so pervasive in
the law and proportionality became an almost sacred principle
158
traversing all areas of both private and public law.
But when certainty breaks down because the actual actions
and intentions of others are not easily observable, tit-for-tat fails.
It can lead to mistaken retaliations and sometimes provoke endless
waves of counterreprisals. The strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats
delays the response to transgressions until the true intentions of
the transgressor are exposed. To maintain deterrence, many-titsfor-many-tats then recommends a disproportionate response. This
strategy is manifested in several doctrines of the laws of war,
criminal law, and international sales law that address conditions
of pervasive uncertainty.
Legal doctrine acquired the wisdom of strategically supporting
cooperation over time by addressing specific circumstances. It
would be foolish to ignore the insights acquired through
generations of experience. But the conditions that the law seeks to
address never rest. They change all the time. To keep up with
changes and learn how to properly address them, a deeper
59
Such a
understanding of the logic behind the law is required.
deeper understanding is the purpose of this Article.

158. See TADROS, supra note 3, at 36.
159. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 991,
1001 (1997).

